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  The predominant focus in research on organizations is either on private or public institutions 
without consistent consideration of their interdependencies. The emphasis in scholarship on private or 
public  interests  has  strengthened  as  disciplinary  and  professional  knowledge  has  deepened:  
management scholars, for example, tend to consider the corporation as the unit of analysis, while 
scholars  of  public  policy  often  analyze  governmental,  multilateral,  community  and  non-profit 
organizations. This article advocates a partial merging of these research agendas on the grounds that 
private  and  public  interests  cannot  be  fully  understood  if  they  are  conceived  independently.  We 
review three major areas of activity today in which public and private interests interact in complex 
ways, and maintain that current theories of organization science can be deployed to understand better 
these interactions. We also suggest that theories of public-private interaction also require development 
and describe a concept called “global sustainable value creation,” which may be used to identify 
organizational and institutional configurations and strategies conducive to worldwide, intertemporal 
efficiency  and  value  creation.  We  conclude  that  scholarship  on  organizations  would  advance  if 
private-public interactions were evaluated by the criterion of global sustainable value creation. 
 
   2 
Introduction 
 
  The field of organization science is devoting greater attention to the interdependence between 
private  and  public  interests:  The  December  2005  issue  of  the  Academy  of  Management  Journal 
contained  several  related  articles  on  management  and  public  policy,  and  a  recent  issue  of  the 
International  Journal  of  Industrial  Organization  (2008)  focuses  on  public-private  partnerships. 
Despite this  increased attention, research studies that deal specifically  with relationships between 
private and public interests continue to be exceptional (Carlsson, 2008). In this article, we maintain 
that the field of organization science would be greatly served by a consistent, sustained focus on the 
connections between public and private concerns. 
Worldwide discussion on public and private interests is currently at a fever pitch over the 
global  financial crisis.  The issue  shows  vividly that  public and  private interests cannot  be fully 
understood if they are conceived as separate (Jacobides 2008, Barney 2005, Hitt 2005). In general, 
public interests are well-defined only when private interests can be aligned or aggregated cogently.  
Ill-defined public interests favor some private interests over others. Thus, public interests run along a 
spectrum from ill- to well-defined.  Under this conceptualization, specific interests may become more 
or less aligned over time and thereby shift in character between private and public.  
Private and public action also may activate the degree of alignment in interests, thus creating 
endogeneity in the public interest.  For example, private transactions in sub-prime lending led to a 
substantial drop in the economic value of federally guaranteed mortgages in the United States (Cowan 
and Cowan 2004), which in turn created a public interest in stabilizing the financial system. For 
another example, public actions such as the release of oil reserves in the wake of high prices have 
substantive economic implications for private firms that invest in oil-extraction technologies under 
initial uncertainty concerning the government’s release policy (Lee and Alm 2004). Furthermore, 
large firms with geographically diverse, specialized activities influence macro-economic trade flows 
and economic development (Dunning 1993). These examples of how private and public decisions 
interact and are inseparable illustrate the challenge of identifying interests, organizations, activities 
and institutions as independently private and public.   3 
Conceptualizing public policy and especially the “public interest” has long been the subject of 
a rich research literature in the social sciences. Classical economists, including Adam Smith (1776), 
considered  the  public  interest  as  the  overall  wealth  of  society.  Drawing  on  research  by  Robbins 
(1935), neoclassical economists used “allocative efficiency” as a fundamental criterion for identifying 
effective economic policy in the public interest, with this key criterion defined as the generation of 
consumer and producer welfare through the effective deployment of scarce resources. Subsequently, 
organization scholars developed alternative criteria for determining actions in the public interest that 
emphasize  intertemporal  wealth  creation  under  resource  scarcity  and  identified  how  rewards  to 
innovative investment are directed (Penrose 1959).   
Our approach in this article is complementary, and conceives of public interests as a complex 
amalgam of interdependent individual, private interests (along the lines of Mahoney and McGahan 
2007). This perspective follows the tradition of Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem, which points to 
the theoretical intractability of aggregating private interests into a well-defined public interest. We 
also conceive of public and private interests as changing over time, as suggested in Doering’s (2007) 
Presidential Address to the American Agricultural Economics Association, which noted that most 
societies go through periods when public goods become quasi-public or private goods and that the 
opposing process occurs as well (Hirschman, 1982). The changing concept of public goods through-
out the economic history of the United States is documented in North (1990). Salient contemporary 
examples include higher education being increasingly valued principally as a private good, and the 
proposed $700 billion bailout of Wall Street enterprises in which specific private institutions may be 
fundamentally transformed to become quasi-public institutions (Zingales 2008). 
Public (or “collective,” Mishan 1982) and private goods are typically conceived as distinctive 
theoretical constructs, but we emphasize here that the nuanced contextual details of interests can 
reveal that a particular good may simultaneously have a public and private character. Furthermore, we 
maintain that the concept of “public or collective goods” should be expanded to allow for multiple 
levels of community, and particularly the global community.  In other words, the unit of analysis for 
understanding the public interest is itself complex.  An alignment of private interests may occur at the   4 
level of the community, state or nation, and yet competing national interests, for example, may mean 
the global public interest is ill-defined. 
We  also  discuss  the  idea  that  many  private  interests  are  defined  by  reference  to  public 
institutions, practices, norms, and incentives:  for example, the private interests of public corporations 
arise from the legal, social and cultural context that establishes the public corporation as a juristic 
person with limited liability. Private interests are often shaped by global collective goods, which are 
defined as non-excludable across borders, generations, and population groups (Kaul, Grunberg and 
Stern 1999).  Knowledge flow is the canonical example of a global public and collective good (Bell 
and Zaheer 2007, Stiglitz 1999). Health, peace, security and a clean environment are examples of 
public  and  collective  goods  that  may be  global.  Potentially  catastrophic  air  pollution  is  a  salient 
example of a global collective good that generates extensive negative externalities. Increasingly, inter-
national institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank are redefining their missions in 
terms  of  global  public  and  collective  goods  provisions,  which  often  differentially  shape  private 
interests across geographical areas and over time. 
These examples demonstrate that private and public interests are interdependent, and yet, 
historically, private and public organizations have been examined primarily in research settings that 
emphasize one or the other type of organization exclusively. In particular, corporations have been 
studied principally by scholars of management while public institutions have been the province of 
economics, political science, education, public health, and public policy. As a consequence, research 
has tended to emphasize, first, how private organizations such as corporations can be constrained in 
the public interest through regulation and other public policy (Spulber 1989), and second, how public 
organizations  can  benefit  from  insights  about  organizational  systems,  structures,  and  practices  in 
private organizations (Simon 1976). Research at the boundaries tended to show how problems of the 
commons (or externalities) emerge in the aggregation of interests (Dahlman 1979, Libecap 1989, 
Stiglitz 1989).  However, little research attention has been devoted to the complex character of many 
phenomena as simultaneously public and private (Doering 2007, Huet and Saussier 2003, Stiglitz 
1998). Notable exceptions include Henisz and Zelner’s (2003) research on non-market strategies and 
on the interplay between business and public policy, Knott and Posen’s (2005) work on entry and exit   5 
in banking, Ouchi et al.’s (2005) study of public schools, and Mahoney and McGahan’s  concern over 
“pervasive  and  worsening  poverty  among  vast  populations  of  the  economically  disenfranchised; 
natural-resource depletion; energy challenges; digitization; the globalization of many industries; the 
prospect  of  skyrocketing  interest  rates;  the  integration  of  capital  markets  across  many  countries; 
corruption and terrorism” (2007: 85). Ouchi (2006) compares innovative with conventional school 
systems and concludes that school performance is tied to decentralized management systems. Such 
analysis  and  discussions  will  lead  to  healthy  debate  (e.g.,  Howard  and  Preisman  2007)  and  an 
increased likelihood of more informed policy decisions. 
   The current article recommends a partial merging of research agendas across diverse areas of 
organizational research to integrate the study of private and public interests using innovative theory 
and methods. In particular, we call for joint research that emphasizes the consequences of policy 
implementation for the interplay of public and private interests. The primary goal is to examine a 
range of subtle issues that reflect the connections between private and public institutions, behavior 
and performance. The agenda proposed considers diversity in public interests, how public and private 
organizations align (or fail to align) their interests, how public and private behavior is shaped by the 
interaction between them, and how public and private interests merge and diverge dynamically. 
  Three observations are made here in support of this proposed research agenda. First, a range 
of institutional forms such as public-private partnerships and governmental sub-contracting can be 
explored more deeply through integration of theories and methods employed by scholars with diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds and research agendas. Some private corporations, foundations and agencies 
are taking on responsibilities that previously were considered part of the public domain. Second, a 
large range of private actions have substantive consequences for the public. For example, many firms 
in  low-income  countries  are  locked  into  competitive  disadvantages  versus  rivals  in  high-income 
countries  (Grabowski  1994).  Third,  a  shift  is  occurring  in  societal  expectations  concerning  the 
limited-liability corporation (McGahan 2007a). This institutional form, which was established in the 
19
th century, protects investors and managers from personal liability for actions they take as stewards 
of invested capital, provided that they do not act fraudulently or commit other crimes in the course of 
their duties. Social preferences for greater accountability are calling this form of economic organiza-  6 
tion into fundamental question. Indeed, the concept of crime is being reconsidered and expanded to 
include ‘white collar’ and corporate offenses, such as infringements against the environment. 
  The following sections discuss: (a) these three major new developments in public-private 
dynamics, which collectively illustrate the compelling need for new ways of thinking; (b) conceptual 
developments  concerning  private-public  interactions  that  can  guide  further  research;  and  (c)  a 
proposal to adopt a new criterion called “sustainable global value creation” to integrate theory and to 
serve as a modern welfare criterion for evaluating policies, actions, institutions and context by both 
private and public actors. This concept involves considering strategies that promote inter-temporal 
efficiency and economic value creation on a global scale. For example, on policies for addressing 
climate change, the criterion would involve analyzing objectives for achieving consummate perform-
ance (Williamson, 1991) in environmental cleanliness over the long run and then aiming to achieve 
appropriate institutional and organizational configurations and actions that promote these objectives, 
given the current and probable future technologies for preserving the environment. We maintain that a 
focus on sustainable global value creation has important implications for organizations, institutions, 
incentives, competition, innovation and global governance.   
Development #1:  Important Institutions that Merge Public and Private Interests 
Research on the connections between public and private interests has focused primarily on 
externalities and agency questions such as: When and how do private interests aggregate to a common 
interest? How should decision-making authority be allocated among individuals for the public good?  
How can externalities best be managed (Hart 1995b, Spulber 1989)? What determines the boundaries 
and the potential ‘optimal mix’ between public and private in a mature market economy (Coase 1960, 
Hart, 2003)? The public choice tradition has also raised questions about whether interests can be 
aggregated, and goes as far as to suggest that the public interest may be a fictionalized construct in 
which public policy is shaped in negotiations among parties that pursue private interests (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962, Stigler 1971).   
The framing of these questions – and the implications both for public and business policy – 
has become limiting since institutions and organizations have formed that reflect public and private   7 
interests simultaneously. Some of these institutions have existed for decades, but have only recently 
become central to the public interest, while others have emerged recently. Examples include sub-
contracted  military  services  (Singer  2003),  privatized  prisons  (McDonald  1990),  and  the  Gates 
Foundation (Muraskin 2006), which is spearheading major initiatives to improve global health. The 
design of these organizations can be seen as endogenously determined by how public and private 
interests are defined and reconciled (Dunbar and Starbuck 2006).  
Several areas of theory in related fields carry the potential to delve deeper into fundamental 
questions that reside in connections between public and private interests within these institutions. 
First,  research  in  Strategic  Management  considers  how  decision-makers  in  a  particular  situation 
interact to create, capture and sustain economic value (Song, Calantone and Di Benedetto 2002). The 
development and application of transaction-cost theory in the context of public-private interactions 
can indicate how the framing of decisions to subcontract essential military services, for example, 
shapes the subsequent emergence of specialized capabilities (Baum and McGahan 2008). Property 
rights and agency theories assert that public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be further understood as 
emerging from inadequate private and public options for resolving incomplete contracting problems 
(Hart 2003, Martimort and Pouyet 2008).  
  Second, recent research on property rights considered through a resource-based view lens 
yields insights about how capabilities are created in the public and private interest, and how these 
capabilities are owned and controlled (Foss and Foss 2005, Kim and Mahoney 2005). Consider the 
privatization of prisons, which has become increasingly prevalent in the past decade (Morris 2007). 
Privately-owned firms compete for contracts on diverse activities such as prison construction, prisoner 
transportation, guard services, food and recreation management, and sanitation and janitorial services. 
Some companies act as general contractors and manage all of these services. Through their normal 
course of business, companies develop competitive advantages based on accumulating capabilities. 
Are these developed capabilities privately or publicly owned? Once an initial contract expires, should 
the sub-contracting state or federal government have property rights to appropriate these capabilities? 
Do these capabilities serve public or private interests or both?  How can these capabilities best be 
sustained (Yang, Farmer and McGahan 2008)?   8 
  Third, theories of agency relationships implemented in the context of a resource-based and 
capability-oriented  view  of  institutional  actors  carry  the  potential  to  shed  substantial  light  on 
governance and decision-making authority (Hambrick, Werder and Zajac 2008). For example, the 
Gates Foundation has influenced the agenda for research concerning neglected diseases in public 
health. One of the priorities for the Foundation is in sponsoring discoveries related to an HIV vaccine 
(Muraskin 2006). Imagine that  a vaccine is  discovered,  perhaps in  a University laboratory  under 
grants from the Gates Foundation. How would property rights to the vaccine be governed? Many 
Universities make partial claims on licensing rights (Argyres and Liebeskind 1998). The interests of 
the Foundation, of patients, and of local governments would be of central concern. Coordinating 
commitment of pharmaceutical companies, distributors, clinicians and others in effective and efficient 
delivery of the vaccine could be enabled by thoughtful research into the consequences for public and 
private welfare. 
  In global public health, the failure of national and international public organizations (Easterly 
2006) has led to intervention by the Gates Foundation. In turn, questions have been raised about 
whether this institution exacerbates market failures as well as resolves them in an interesting inversion 
of the public choice critique of the public sector. Is it in the public interest for the Gates Foundation to 
take such a large role in this effort? Many observers applaud the Foundation’s involvement, and yet 
the creation of economic value is in the interactions of the Foundation with others. The Foundation’s 
purpose is to marshal resources in the interests of the public, but it is specific in its strategy about 
which members of the public should receive priority. The large amount of resources concentrated on 
one disease can have important consequences for research on other major infectious diseases and even 
on health systems in resource-limited settings such as in Haiti, where primary health has suffered in 
some instances despite the improvements in HIV care (Garrett 2007).  By integrating the study of this 
type of institution, which is privately organized and managed, into the broader complex of public and 
private policy, we can learn from the precedent that it is setting and better understand the implications 
for complementary institutions, including private entrepreneurs and public policy bodies. The place to 
start would be in evaluating the existence and/or development of capabilities and their combination in 
ways that create more economic value than each involved organization can provide, develop, and   9 
leverage alone, as well as the potential side effects and the requisite governance structures that can 
help  reduce  any  negative  externalities.  While  research  in  political  economy  (e.g.,  Shepsle  and 
Weingast 1981) has dealt with game-theoretic facets of integrating private interests, relatively less 
attention in this field has attended to the administrative challenges of integration.   
  In sum, institutions and organizations shaped both by private and public interests are essential 
to achieve effective public and business policy.  Agents acting in the public interest often have private 
agendas (Mueller 2006, Spulber 1989).  Private interests do not aggregate in simple ways, but also co-
evolve  with  public  interests  endogenously.  Standard  approaches  emphasizing  the  tragedy  of  the 
commons and externalities analyses do not deal comprehensively with this endogeneity or with the 
central challenge of managing complex capabilities, which develop as private and public interests co-
evolve.   
 
Development #2:  Private Actions with Implications for Public Welfare 
 
Private institutions, and the interests embedded in them, are often the initiators, instruments 
and objectives of public policy.  In the 1980s, the United States famously bailed out Chrysler (Luger 
2000) and Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust (Stern and Feldman 2004), and in the 1990s, 
intervention by the federal government was essential to combat the instability created by the failure of 
Long-Term  Capital  Management,  a  hedge  fund  that  could  not  cover  its  obligations  (Lowenstein 
2000). The Savings & Loan bailouts of 1989 (White 1991) and 1995 (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997) 
were tied to instances of fraud, malfeasance and bad management. Enron and the corporate account-
ing scandals of the early 2000’s rocked public confidence in even the largest and most established of 
public corporations (McLean and Elkind 2003, Squires, Smith, McDougal and Yeack 2003) and even 
sparked congressional hearings. As financial markets around the world reeled with failures in the sub-
prime lending market (Argitis and Pitelis 2008, Cowan and Cowan 2004, Stiglitz 2008), the initial 
stabilizing interventions were done by Goldman Sachs, among others.  This intervention, coordinated 
by the US Federal Reserve, was designed in the public interest, and was facilitated by Goldman 
Sachs’ private action. These examples reveal the intertemporal character of public interests:  Effective 
intervention today may prevent the need for more substantial public intervention tomorrow.   10 
The  interplay  between  private  and  public  action  dates  back  to  the  origins  of  sovereign 
government.  What is new concerning these situations is (a) their salience, scale and frequency (Lev, 
2003); (b) the complexity of responses to protect the public interest, and, particularly, the involvement 
of private organizations (such as Goldman Sachs in the sub-prime lending crisis) to protect public 
welfare; and (c) the extensive consequences of both private failures and public-private responses both 
as precedents for subsequent interventions and as acts that redistribute wealth.  
By integrating the research agendas of business and public policy, a number of theoretical and 
empirical advances within organization science become possible.  First, trans-disciplinary integration 
carries the promise of promoting greater understanding of the leadership, reputational and governance 
consequences of private and public actions. The benefits of such integration are now understood to be 
especially  high  in  the  wake  of  actions  that  can  cause  such  damage  to  private  interests  that  they 
reverberate into  public problems. The nationalization  of  mortgage giants Freddie and Fannie  and 
insurance giant AIG are cases in point. 
Second,  additional  theoretical  and  empirical  work  is  needed  concerning  public  resources, 
including but not limited to financing, relationships, access, authority and responsibility. What are the 
tradeoffs associated with allocating resources to rescue private corporations from insolvency?  How 
should the capabilities that have accumulated within the rescued corporations be managed after public 
resources are used to develop them?  Research is needed concerning the origins and emergence of 
public resources, and on how they are deployed most effectively in the presence of complementarities 
with private capabilities. For example, how should the returns to a potentially valuable mine on public 
land be allocated and managed? Some authorities have noted that non-renewable resources tend to be 
dramatically  under-priced  in  private  markets.  Should  governments  intervene  to  assure  that  these 
resources are priced to reflect their net present value?  If so, how is this process managed given that 
the political careers of those in authority are substantially shorter than the time horizons over which 
the resources retain their economic value?  
Questions emerge about protecting the public interest when the complementarities between 
private and public resources are so strong as to create a moral hazard incentive among private parties 
to engage in excessive risk-taking such as occurred during the sub-prime lending crisis. How should   11 
private interests in public spaces be constrained? If sub-prime lenders extended credit under the belief 
that they would be bailed out of possible trouble, then are regulations failing?  Is the public served by 
the refusal of protection to over-extended borrowers? Are there any other forms of regulation that 
would be more effective than the promise of bailouts, or that could help minimize the risk of potential 
future bailouts being required?  
Third, the consequences of the depletion of public resources must be studied in a dynamic 
context. Because some public resources cannot be replenished (think of the long-run depletion of 
fossil fuels, McGahan 2008) or are depleted temporarily (the Fed cannot change the discount rate too 
frequently), public resources often must be valued intertemporally and by broader metrics than private 
resources. In particular, market valuations on public resources may fail for reasons extending beyond 
only contemporaneous externalities. The “Stern Report” (Stern 2008) is a useful step in this direction 
since it provides pecuniary estimates (shadow prices) of carbon (Hope, 2008). Additional research is 
needed  to  obtain  accurate  economic  valuations,  decision  metrics,  control  rights,  and  property 
allocations on a range of public resources (Barzel 1989, Libecap 1989).  
Finally, an improved understanding of risk-taking is crucial for evaluating the intersection of 
public and private interests. Differences in risk tolerance and the scope of relevant uncertainty are 
central to effective decisions concerning how to manage events such as the sub-prime lending crisis.  
Institutional developments such as trading in derivatives, legitimized by public actions such as the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, enable private actions that have multi-faceted conse-
quences for the public interest.  Institutional arrangements that reduce risk (Rosenberg and Birdzell 
1986), and internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of private investments (North 1981), are 
critical determinants of economic development. In addition, public authorities often have responsi-
bilities that shape risk and uncertainty for private actors. In certain cases, the public can take action 
that can create new areas of private activity. A case in point is the new carbon markets that have been 
created through government legislation (Convery, Ellerman and Perthuis 2008). We need a better 
understanding of the extent to which private risks should be “internalized” by the public domain, as 
well as whether and when does this internalization serve mutual interests. Thus, in the public domain, 
choices about managing the context for private risk also must also receive attention.    12 
Development #3:  The Limited Liability Corporation and the Public Interest 
 
  The limited liability public corporation, established in the late 19
th century, has become the 
centerpiece  of  research  on  private  sector  organizations.  Executive-managed,  investor-owned,  and 
publicly-traded corporations constitute a significant part of the economy. By a recent estimate, more 
than 20,000 of these limited liability corporations exist and account for more than 15% of worldwide 
economic activity (McGahan and Porter 2003).   
  Yet many other forms of economic organizations exist.  More than 3 million partnerships and 
registered proprietorships exist in the United States alone. Privately owned corporations that are not 
publicly traded -- including those controlled by large private-equity firms -- constitute a large and 
growing portion of economic activity. Non-governmental agencies such as Oxfam, the American Red 
Cross, and Save the Children are major recipients of public aid and private charity (Black 1992, Gilbo 
1987, Watson 2006).  Charitable foundations, which are typically exempted from taxes in the public 
interest, fulfill their missions by dispersing funds through payments to private parties. Subcontractors 
with both tax-exempt and taxable status are central to military operations. Governmental expenditures 
constitute a large and growing proportion of economic activity. Outside the US, governments have 
engendered  institutional  innovation  that  blurs  the  public-private  boundary.  China’s  Household 
Responsibility System, under which land belonging to the public is assigned to households, is an 
important case  in point (Rodrik  2004). Corporate  governance reforms in Japan designed to align 
private and public interests have fundamentally transformed the risks taken by businesses after the 
1988 financial-system crisis in that country (Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire 2007). 
  To understand the nature and scope of economic activity, the agendas of organization scholars 
must be broadened to emphasize a wider range of institutions than the publicly traded, limited-liability 
corporation (McGahan 2007a, 2007b). Management problems in private equity, non-governmental 
institutions,  private  foundations,  governmental  agencies,  and  international  institutions  should  be 
addressed  by  researchers  from  a  range  of  disciplines.  Solutions  to  market  failures  should  be 
conceptualized in terms of hierarchies that take multiple forms rather than the principal form of the 
limited-liability corporation (Williamson 1991).  This proposed shift is not a matter of discontinuing   13 
study  of  corporations  but,  rather,  a  matter  of  rebalancing  emphasis  of  organization  research  to 
consider  returns  on  invested  capital  more  comprehensively  and  more  systematically.  In  addition, 
McGahan (2007a) maintains that organization scholars should deal with a much more diverse set of 
mechanisms  for achieving returns  on invested  capital  than  available  only through publicly-traded 
corporations. The returns of large, public corporations have been influenced by the scale and scope of 
economic activity in other types of organizations, and should be examined comprehensively.  
Several major research opportunities arise from this agenda.  First, the dissociation between 
private and public finance must be corrected. The two areas of activity are linked analytically under 
neo-classical assumptions of individual rationality (as suggested by ‘rational expectations’ scholars, 
see Tobin, 1980 for a critique), and are also tied because public financing depends on their effective 
administration through, for example, private banks and other financial institutions. Agency theory 
must be extended significantly to consider how the generation of new value-creating opportunities 
depends specifically on the interplay between public and private interests, as well as their respective 
differential capabilities for innovation and economic value creation. The consequences of new forms 
of financing and risk sharing such as hedge funds, private equity and securitization for value creation 
must be evaluated in light of how the public interest evolves over time. The concurrent concentration 
of  ownership  and  enhanced  risk-taking  to  generate  higher  returns  in  the  short  run  may  not  be 
consistent with value creation over the long run (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes and Khan 2008).  
Second, the emergence of alternative forms of economic organization raises questions about 
how resources are developed and allocated in a system that does not aim to maximize aggregate return 
on invested capital, but instead emphasizes maximizing the personal returns of specific investors. 
Research on the interplay between value creation and value capture is needed in this context. What are 
the consequences of different forms of organization for resource allocation and deployment? What 
kinds of resources are best deployed through different types of organizations? How can financial 
capital best be allocated into the hands of competent managers to create other forms of capital?  What 
new forms of corporate organization may be effective for aligning public and private objectives? 
Finally, broad questions arise concerning the nature of innovation and the roles of public 
institutions in the generation of knowledge in the modern economic environment. The Bayh-Dole Act,   14 
which, in practice, generates private property rights to NIH-sponsored research for private and quasi-
public Universities, represents a new form of wealth transfer that carries important consequences for 
economic incentives to innovate. While excellent analysis has been done on this topic (e.g., Thursby 
and Thursby 2002), additional research on the nature and consequences of science --- its scale, scope, 
locus, application and potential commercializability --- is needed to understand how property rights 
and  decision  authority  evolves  over  time  (Kaplan  and  Murray  2008).  Parallel  opportunities  for 
research arise on other issues in public policy, education, public health, fine arts, medicine, law and 
social sciences.  
 
Conceptual Opportunities on Public-Private Interactions 
 
  New theory on public-private interactions also promises to generate insights concerning both 
business and public policy.  We next consider: (a) extending established theory; (b) bridging theories 
within organization science; (c) importing new problems into organization science from other fields; 
and (4) developing new theory and concepts. 
Extending established theory.  The first opportunity for advance is to extend current theories 
of the firm to address directly the interplay of private and public interests.  Because public interests 
are a function of the degree of alignment of private interests – and of mechanisms employed to define 
the public interest in the absence of alignment – the interplay between private and public interests 
raises questions about individual differences and the ways in which common interests are framed.  In 
particular, recent advances in organization science consider the sources and dynamics of change in the 
institutional environment.  Additional research is needed on questions on framing, mechanism design, 
and the diversity of private interests.  Because private and public interests evolve over time, central 
questions arise regarding the robustness and veracity of interests in light of long-term commitments of 
resources to serve them.   
The resource-based view (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993, Teece 1982, Wernerfelt 1984) carries 
potential to support policy makers in evaluating intertemporal implications of particular public invest-
ments that create new assets, which can take diverse forms and serve private interests differentially 
over time. For example, if greater public expenditures are allocated to cultivate specific skills in a   15 
population through publicly supported education and training, then a community may eventually excel 
internationally in an affected area; and the development of a public resource such as a marketplace or 
an information exchange may eventually create new opportunities in the public interest (Grabowski 
1994, Rodrik 2004). Extending theory to address the interplay between private and public interests 
requires detailed investigation into the micro-dynamics of aggregation (Mayer and Argyres 2004). 
Bridging theories within organization science. A second area of opportunity is in the develop-
ment of theory at the intersection of established areas of inquiry in the field.  Organization science has 
established that the interplay between management and community interests is nuanced. When a firm 
develops a particular capability, some members of the public community may benefit significantly 
(e.g., the firm’s customers or employees) while others are adversely affected (Donaldson and Preston 
1995, Post, Preston and Sachs 2002). An important research agenda is to explore issues concerning 
whether and how business policy and public policy could be aligned and the extent to which and how 
organization science can contribute to this objective. A primary goal would be to better understand 
how public actions may differentially affect private interests and further how private actions may 
differentially affect public capabilities. 
  In general, firms operate in an institutional and regulatory context that is heavily influenced 
by government (Shapiro and Taylor 1990, Spulber 1989, Rodrik 2004). Business policy often aims to 
adapt and/or shape this regulatory context, which may create concerns of regulatory capture (Mueller 
2006, Posner 1974, Stigler 1971). Such concerns are typically based on a supposition that the interests 
of business and the public diverge. A rationale for this perspective is grounded in economics and goes 
at least as far back as Adam Smith’s (1776) dictum on conspiratorial tendencies by “people of the 
same trade” to raise and then maintain these higher prices -- “collusion” in today’s parlance. Is this 
view fully justified today? Can organization science research lead to different implications? How can 
we better understand public-private partnerships in the context of the tendencies for collusion to arise?  
Does government tend to promote monopoly when it engages with specific firms or industries (North 
1991)? Is government more prone to failures than the market, and/or to inducing market failures 
(Buchanan 1986)? Can well-intentioned private actions lead to market and public failures? Is the 
public sector more prone to value destroying rent-seeking activities than the market (Krueger 1974)?   16 
When firms seek to be innovative through standardization or some other form of direct interaction, are 
their interests aligned with those of the public?  This agenda must begin with a clearer conceptualiza-
tion of public interests, activities, organizations and institutions than has currently been implemented 
in much of the research in the field.    
  Over the past thirty years, a substantial literature in organizational economics has become 
influential in organization science. Leading figures in Economics - Ronald Coase (1960, 1988) and 
Oliver Williamson (1996) in transaction costs theory; Oliver Hart (1995a, 2003) and Douglass North 
(1990) in property rights theory; Kenneth Arrow (1985) and Michael Jensen (1983) in agency theory; 
Edith Penrose (1959) and David Teece (1982) in resource-based research; and Joseph Schumpeter 
(1934), and Richard Nelson & Sidney Winter (1982) in evolutionary economics --- have contributed 
to organization science by considering contemporaneously both business and public policy. 
   The  implications  of  these  theories  for  business  policy  have  been  extensively  explored 
(Mahoney  2005).  However,  the  public  policy  implications  of  these  theories  have  received  less 
attention. In particular, given that no absolute definition of the public interest is possible, and given 
that all public policy serves some private interests over others, then business and public policy may be 
entirely interdependent. This interdependency deserves substantially more attention in research.  What 
can we learn, for example, about the implications of the process of privatization (of many types of 
organizations such as prisons) for community welfare? More research is needed to obtain satisfactory 
answers to this question.  Business policy has emphasized Coase’s (1937) transactional work on the 
nature of the firm, but has not fully incorporated Coase’s (1960) work on the relationships between 
the social costs (e.g., the negative externality by-products) of investing in particular goods in the 
context of positive transaction costs and its far-reaching implications for law and public policy.  In a 
world of zero transaction costs, legal liability would not matter for economic efficiency -- the so-
called “Coase Theorem (1960)” -- while in a world of positive transaction costs, liability rules can 
matter  greatly  for  economic  efficiency  (Dahlman  1979).  In  the  case  of  privatization,  asymmetric 
information and positive transaction costs may mean that the most appropriate private actor may not 
win  contracts  on  government  business.  This  result  is  but  one  of  potentially  many  instances  and 
outcomes of “rent seeking” (Krueger 1974; Tullock 1989).    17 
An opportunity exists for further application of property rights theory to understand public-
private partnerships (PPPs) as contracts (Hart, 2003) and to identify conditions under which PPPs 
emerge  optimally  (Martimort  and  Pouyet  2008).  Furthermore,  opportunities  continue  to  arise  for 
integrating into economic theory the strategic implications of market failure, heterogeneous firms and 
imperfect competition (Baumol 1991, Helfat et al. 2007, Teece 2007, Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). 
Endogenous growth theories (Lucas 1988, Romer 1986) acknowledge such concerns for policy and 
yet  do  not  explicitly  incorporate  the  strategic  responses  of  firms  with  diverse  capabilities  and 
activities into policy prescriptions. Our collective understanding can be enabled by  exploring the 
implications of recent advances in organization policy on public policy.  
  Policies that are designed to regulate firm behavior would be better informed by management 
research. A prominent example of the potential for insight arises from the work of Edith Penrose, 
often credited as the seminal author in the resource-based view.  Penrose (1959) claimed that even if a 
process of growth is efficient, the large sizes of those firms that may emerge as stewards of crucial 
resources  may  lead  to  inefficient  monopolistic  market  practices.  The  implication,  evocative  of  a 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction (Foster and Kaplan 2001), is that government should 
aim to balance the promotion of innovative practices with their potential consequences for ex post 
monopolistic practices, by, for example, devising policies and institutional configurations that favor 
perennial innovation and a level playing field. 
Research at the intersection of business and public policy could address such questions as 
how should we structure public-private contracts to promote the emergence and development of new 
capabilities while diluting the prospect of ex post monopoly?  The objective of this new area of policy 
studies is to cultivate innovation and creativity along the lines of Penrose (1959) to support a process 
of sustainable wealth creation (Pitelis 2007a).   
Importing problems into organization science from other fields.  Insights from organization 
science have been applied to several problems that have traditionally been dealt with most effectively 
in other fields. For example, Jorde and Teece (1990) apply and develop important management and 
resource-based  insights  concerning  inter-temporal  efficiency,  cooperation,  innovation  and  their 
interactions. This analysis calls for changes in US anti-trust legislation to account for the positive   18 
welfare  implications  of  non-collusive  interfirm  cooperation  over  innovation.  Recent  advances  on 
issues of competitiveness such as Porter’s (1990) “diamond model,” which emphasizes the role of 
industrial clusters and public-private partnerships, resonate with Schumpeterian and resource-based 
views (Foster and Kaplan 2001, Pitelis 2007a).  While these approaches often involve elements of 
both public and business policy, the interaction between the two has yet to be explored fully.  
Developing new theory and concepts. A final area of opportunity for conceptual development 
is  new  constructs,  concepts  and  theories  for  investigating  interrelationships  between  private  and 
public interests. Opportunities in this area are extensive and reflect new research at multiple levels of 
analysis.  Micro-behavioral  research  on  the  structure  of  private  interests  promises  to  yield  insight 
about alternative mechanisms for their aggregation into community, sovereign and global interests. 
Macro-behavioral analysis investigating the mechanisms by which individuals express, balance and 
advocate  their  interests  can  generate  insights  about  the  dynamics  of  public  interests.  Structural 
analysis on how public interests are integrated over time carries promise to yield insights on both their 
foundations  and  policy  implications.    Finally,  new  macro-social  concepts  carry  promise  for 
expressing, understanding and analyzing the interdependence of public and private interests.  The next 
section presents an example of such a concept.  
 
The Integrative Concept of Sustainable Global Value Creation 
 
The examples discussed in the previous sections considered the interface of business and 
public policy and the opportunities for research in theory and empirics. To illustrate the potential for 
insights, this section briefly discusses a new concept called “sustainable global value creation” (Pitelis 
2007a), which is defined below. 
One  salient  conceptual  lens  for  analyzing  public  policy  is  industrial  organization  (IO),  a 
branch  of  economics.  Two  basic  premises  of  the  IO  paradigm  are  that  firms  seek  to  maximize 
economic profits and that governmental bodies may correct market imperfections (Scherer and Ross 
1990, Tirole 1988). For example, the pursuit of economic value capture through restrictive practices 
by firms can hinder efficient resource allocation, leading to the need for government intervention.   19 
According to this approach, antitrust policies should aim to effect industry structures with strong 
productive and allocative efficiency. 
A facet of this view is that it focuses on static allocative efficiency rather than inter-temporal 
innovative  efficiency  (Kaldor  1972).  In  particular,  innovation  is  not  centrally  addressed  in  the 
neoclassical economic model (Baumol 1991). As noted by Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959), and 
Nelson  &  Winter  (2002),  once  inter-temporal  or  dynamic  efficiency  –  and  thus  economic  value 
creation  through  innovation  –  is  considered,  then  a  range  of  oligopolistic  and  even  monopolistic 
industry structures may be superior to perfect competition and contestable markets for innovation and 
dynamic efficiency (Aghion and Howitt 1998, Sutton 1998).  
In an early effort to account for both non-collusive cooperative arrangements between firms 
and innovation (in its inter-relationship with inter-firm cooperation), Jorde and Teece (1990) called 
for changes to US antitrust policies to account for the dynamic efficiencies of such arrangements. 
“Systems of innovation” approaches (De la Mothe and Paquet 1996, Freeman 1988, Lundvall 1992, 
Nelson 1993) point to public-private partnerships and the wider organizational and institutional nexus 
around firms that promotes innovation, economic value creation and competitiveness (Aiginger 2006). 
Such a nexus can include industrial clusters, public-private partnerships, social capital, NGOs and 
other non-public, non-private organizations.  
Until  recently,  the  field  of  Industrial  Organization  has  focused  on  evaluating  inter-firm 
cooperation primarily as collusion and principally as price collusion. As noted by Richardson (1972), 
however, inter-firm cooperation may also have efficiency implications. This idea is explicit in Porter 
(1998) and subsequent analysis of networks and clusters (Bell and Zaheer 2007). The “systems of 
innovation” approach to public policy is a potent alternative to the market structure-oriented approach 
of neoclassical economics and is currently receiving attention by policymakers in Europe (Pitelis 
2007a). Yet despite its substantial merits, this perspective falls short of providing a comprehensive 
framework  for  addressing  the  relations  between  public  and  private  interests,  especially  for  the 
purposes of organization science scholars, for at least three reasons. First, the systems perspective (as 
well as Penrose (1959) and the RBV as a whole) do not yet account for agency issues that arise from 
the  nature,  role  and  significance  of  divergent  economic  interests  and  for  related  problems  of   20 
“collective action” (Olson 1971). The systems view emphasizes the benefits of innovation by nations, 
regions and sectors (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson 2005). However, potentially divergent interests 
within firms, networks, regions and nations can be important in determining both the character and 
direction  of  innovation  (Cyert  and  March  1963,  Gottschalg  and  Zollo  2007,  Gupta,  Tesluck  and 
Taylor 2007, Pitelis 2007b, Rothaermel and Hess 2007). As Lundvall, a protagonist of the approach, 
observes: “the concept was intended to help develop an alternative analytical framework to standard 
economics and to criticize its neglect of dynamic processes related to innovation and learning when 
analyzing economic growth and economic development” (2007, p. 96). 
A second limitation of the systems perspective concerns the sustainability of value creation. 
Sustainability  is  a  condition  satisfied  when  agents,  acting  in  their  short-run  self-interest,  do  not 
undermine their own long-run interests or the interests of successive generations of economic actors 
(Lenox 2006). Sustainable actions may not yield net inter-temporal systemic economic benefits (i.e., 
there is no guarantee that innovations will not generate first-mover advantages, dominant positions, 
restricted entry or stemmed forces of “creative destruction,” which subvert long-term efficiency). In 
this context, a focus on firm-level innovation is not adequate by itself to ensure sustainability (Murray 
and O’Mahony 2007, Rothaermel and Hess 2007).  
A third problem with the “systems of innovation” view is that it focuses principally on the 
nation state. However, nation states may hinder the process of global value creation if they pursue 
narrow interests in, for example, strategic trade policies that undermine the value creating capabilities 
of firms in less developed countries (Grabowski 1994, Stiglitz 1989). With few notable exceptions 
(Nelson 2007, Nelson and Winter 2002), the systems perspective shares with industrial organization 
economics  a  focus  on  the  nation  and  does  not  emphasize  how  firms  and  nations  may  restrain 
competition (and trade) inter-temporally, and thereby undermine sustainability.  
The limitations of the systems approach are recognized by Lundvall: “The need for a change 
in  theoretical  foundations  and  for  a  new  paradigm  for  designing  public  policy  has  not  yet  been 
fulfilled’ (2007 p. 97). Lundvall (2007) proposes more emphasis on issues of distribution of power, 
institution-building and the openness of innovation systems. All of these issues, we maintain, are 
integral to and can be addressed through the concept of global sustainable value creation (GSVC). We   21 
therefore propose that the criterion of GSVC is enacted to diagnose and evaluate the consequences of 
economic activities for private and public welfare. As an economic construct, total economic value 
created  equals  the  sum  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus  at  a  given  point  in  time.  A  focus  on 
innovation allows for the fact that investment may increase consumer welfare as well as producer 
surplus over time. “Sustainable global value creation” also accounts for externalities and restrictive 
practices, and thus considers a broader context than is the norm in research on industrial organization.  
The purpose of introducing this criterion into the vocabulary of researchers is to cultivate an 
understanding of the linkages between individual and business activity at one place and time with 
interests that may arise in other places and in the future. The word “global” draws attention to the 
world community rather than on the interests of sovereign states, businesses or local communities. 
“Sustainability” points to the intertemporal nature of the linkages between actions.  “Value creation” 
is intended in the sense of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) to account for both the benefits and costs 
of activities (i.e., some opportunities for impact may generate great benefits but may be too costly to 
implement effectively).  
This criterion is not unique in its focus on the creation of value or on sustainability per se.  
The need for a new welfare criterion arises from the complex interactions between private and public 
actors that unfold over time. Time inconsistency problems – what seems right in the short run may 
prove wrong in the longer run – can arise from bounded rationality, simple mistakes, or divergent 
interests that change over time (Tirole 1988). The need for interest alignment is crucial in general and 
is of interest to organization science scholars in particular.  This criterion allows for study of evolving, 
interacting interests within organizations (Cyert and March 1963, Gottschalg and Zollo 2007, Pitelis 
2007b) and between organizations, among individuals, and across governments (Hirschman 1982, 
North 1981, Olson 1971). 
An emphasis on sustainability reflects the view that the pursuit of individual interest some-
times undermines systemic interests and may undermine the achievement of individual self-interest in 
a subsequent period.  Consider, for example, two types of relationships that are particularly difficult to 
analyze comprehensively using the industrial organization and systems of innovation perspectives: 
firm-national and national-global.   22 
Sustainable competitive advantages (SCA) in firms do not always serve the national interest. 
When firms achieve competitive advantages through restrictive practices, they may undermine the 
sustainability of nationwide value creation by constraining competition, innovation and learning. This 
idea has been explored extensively in the industrial organization research literature. For example, 
Microsoft has been fined by regulatory authorities for restricting competition. The emphasis under the 
criterion  of  sustainable  global  value  creation  is  on  the  implications  of  restricted  competition  on 
dynamic efficiency. Even when firms achieve competitive advantages through innovation, the risk is 
present that these firms may resort to restrictive practices. In this context, public policy is required to 
sustain the process of economic value creation by facilitating perennial innovation through a level-
playing field and support to small and medium sized enterprises in order that competition not be 
subverted (Penrose 1959). 
More  generally,  firms  understandably  engage  in  political  activities  when  they  are  highly 
dependent on government regulation or contracts for economic survival; and under such conditions, 
the  subversion  of  competition  may  be  likely  when  there  are  large  firms  operating  in  more 
concentrated industries (Bonardi, Hill and Keim 2005). Indeed, it is well documented empirically that 
firm-specific  benefits  result  from  political  strategies  (Hillman,  Keim  and  Schuler  2004,  Hillman, 
Zardkoohi and Bierman 1999). On the one hand, strategic political management over time can be 
considered a dynamic capability and a source of value creation (Oliver and Holzinger 2008). From a 
resource-based  view,  firms  compete  in  strategic  factor  markets  and  political  markets  not  only  to 
access  economically  valuable  resources  for  themselves  but  also  to  exert  control  over  their 
competitors’ resources (Capron and Chatain 2008, Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer 2002). Furthermore, 
strategic insight can be gained from treating political markets as a type of strategic factor market 
(Maritan and Florence 2008).  
On the other hand, as noted by the “public choice” school of analysis (Mueller 2006), national 
policies  may  be  captured  by  private  interests  and  may  reflect  collusion  between  firms  and  their 
governments  for  mutual  gain  (Hillman  and  Hitt  1999,  Olson  1971,  North  1991).  Possibilities  of 
regulatory capture (Posner 1974, Stigler 1971) call for pluralism of institutional and organizational 
structures  that  provide  checks  and  balances  to  promote  sustainability  such  as  through  NGOs,   23 
consumer associations, firm clusters, clubs, associations and ‘social capital’ (Lundvall 2007, Moran 
and  Ghoshal  1999,  Nelson  2007,  Putnam  1993).  These  organizational  and  institutional  structures 
emerge and develop endogenously with the interests that they seek to monitor. In some documented 
instances, they fail to ensure sustainability given the potential incentives for firms and nations to 
maximize the surplus accrued to them, and the panoply of means and policies that large firms and 
developed nations have at their disposal (Ramamurti 2004).  
Additional research is essential to better understand these failures, the role  of extant and 
potentially embedded power structures, and how these failures can be addressed. The global financial 
crisis is adding credence and urgency to this need. In contrast, the criterion of GSVC suggests that 
protectionism  by  developing  countries  in  critical  industries  may  promote  economic  welfare  by 
infusing competition, innovation and learning into the system (Nelson 2007, Pitelis 2004). Differential 
treatment of developed and developing economies is an immediate corollary to the GSVC construct 
and is predicated not on grounds of fairness but on grounds of economic efficiency.  Strategic trade 
policies developed under GSVC call for institutional and organizational configurations that account 
for  global  rather  than  only  national  interests.  Academic  research  using  this  construct  is  essential 
because  practicing  organizations  previously  charged  with  responsibility  for  considering  global 
interests have sometimes failed.  For example, research on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
others show that such organizations are not immune to “capture” (Ramamurti 2004). The complex 
interrelationships  between  global  governance,  national  policy,  and  business  policy  (Pitelis  2009, 
Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire 2007) mean that this research is imperative. 
A focus on global sustainable value creation raises new questions concerning the interaction 
between business policies and the interests of individuals, nations, regions, and other economic actors. 
Sustainability raises ‘strategic contradictions’ (Smith and Tushman 2005) such as cooperation without 
collusion,  the  avoidance  of  restrictive  practices,  and  the  intersection  of  short-term  efficiency  and 
innovative efficiency. Better policy depends on deeper  research into the complex  implications  of 
actors, actions and initiatives such as privatized prisons, quasi-public agencies, and strategic trade 
policies.    24 
The concept of global sustainable value creation may yield insight about opportunities for 
collective action that cannot be readily implemented in a practical sense. One major problem is in the 
possibility of identifying a public interest. Arrow’s (2003) Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that, 
with as few as three discrete alternatives, there is no voting procedure that can convert the ranked 
preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking system while also simultaneously meeting 
reasonable  distributive  and  fairness  criteria  such  as  unrestricted  domain,  non-imposition,  Pareto 
efficiency, non-dictatorship, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow 1963, Sen 1970).  
In addition, GSVC is predicated on knowledge about the actors, actions and policies that 
promote  worldwide  sustainability  of  value  creation.  This  requires  a  high  degree  of  knowledge, 
rationality and learning. It is for this reason that our emphasis is on institutional and organization 
configurations  that  diagnose,  transfer,  and  create  knowledge  and  learning  (Argote  1999,  Rodrik 
2004).  We  also  recognize  that,  even  if  the  global  sustainability  objective  is  adopted,  the 
implementation of appropriate policies may be impeded by collective-action and prisoner’s dilemma  
problems  (Kapur  2002),  as  well  as  challenges  of  asymmetric  information,  limited  or  absent 
information  and  coordination  (Hausmann,  Rodrik  and  Sabel    2008).  Collective  action  can  arise 
whenever it is in the interest of a (usually small) powerful group to thwart change that is inimical to 
their short-term interests. Prisoner’s dilemma problems involve situations where the pursuit of self-
interest by agents leads to actions that fail to promote the joint interests of the parties involved, even 
when these agents are aware that certain more beneficial actions are available. Absent and limited 
information by the public and/or the private sector as well as coordination failures between private 
agents point to the need for public-private interactions in order to acquire information, and to public 
intervention aimed to solve marker-failure engendering coordination failures. In this context, Rodrik 
(2004) claims that the role of government should be to liaise with the private sector without being 
captured by it.  Overall, the literature on the hazards of ‘capture’ focus on market failures at the 
national level without identifying optimal levels of behavior at the global level.. 
Sustainable global value  creation requires the conceptualization of international collective 
goods. Such goods can be organized by hegemonic powers (Kindleberger 1986) or within systems 
that are diverse organizationally and institutionally (Moran and Ghoshal 1999). Despite the benefits of   25 
centralization for speedier decision-making and coordination, even enlightened “hegemony” is subject 
to important limitations such as an incentive to allocate monopoly rights (North 1990).  Yet “systems” 
cannot provide international collective goods such as global safety – they can simply help guard 
against hazards in their dispensation by states and international organizations. In addition, “systems” 
can enable collective goods and their sustainability. Global sustainable value creation as a construct 
yields a benchmark for “enlightened” private and public interests and may even ultimately serve to 
deter hegemonic capture and system failure. This diversity and procedural rationality-based approach 
is in line with organization science (Simon 1995) and pluralist theories in political science (Lively 
1978, Vincent 1987).  
An indicative example of a public-private interaction that could be predicted and explicated 
by our focus on global sustainability, but not by other perspectives, concerns the Gates Foundation. 
This involves enlightened behavior by the private sector, motivated by global sustainability concerns 
and that brings in the public sector in order to leverage respective advantages to achieve a purpose, 
which is difficult to explain, either in terms of narrow rational utility maximization (the IO view), or 
the national interest (the “systems” view). A focus on global and sustainability helps explain this 
purpose. At the same time, the potential distortion that can be created when the public sector and its 
role are taken over by private players, call for pluralism and diversity that help create checks and 
balances through mutual monitoring and bonding. The reaction to the role of the Gates Foundation by 
WHO officials is a case in point. A focus on GSVC enacted through pluralism and diversity could 
have helped avoid the current problems of global financial markets. These problems are arguably the 
result of a neglect of sustainability, of embedded power structures, an exclusive focus on short-term 
interest, a belief that markets are self-regulating, and even of financial hypocricy (Stiglitz 2007). The 
world-wide conditions of the crisis are a powerful reminder that we are all in the same boat and that 
sustainability is key.    26 
A non-exhaustive list of research areas emanating from a focus on GSVC, include: 
￿  The link between firm-level SCAs and nation-wide SCAs, to include the re-definition of 
S in firm-level SCA, to allow for its impact on nation-wide sustainability. 
 
￿  The link between public policy for nation-wide SCA and the sustainability of Global 
Value Creation, to include the redefinition of S in nation-wide CA to account for its 
impact on world-wide sustainability. 
 
￿  The  link  between  business  strategy  and  public  policy  that  helps  promote  worldwide 
sustainable economic development. 
 
￿  The boundaries and ‘optimal mix’ of public-private, market-hierarchy-networks, intra- 
and internationally for GSVC. 
 
￿  The  link  between  corporate  governance,  public  governance  and  global  governance 
(Hambrick, Werder and Zajac 2008) 
 
￿  The  interaction  between  market,  public,  hybrid  failures-successes,  their  differential 
capabilities and their link to GSVC. 
 
￿  The  identification  of  win-win  situations  by  private,  public  and  inter-national 
organizations (that is actions that promote common interests and sustainability), but also 
win-lose ones, and an analysis of what can be done and by whom in win-lose cases so as 
to restore sustainability. 
 
Our intent in introducing the concept of global sustainable value creation is not to create an 
actionable policy agenda immediately, but rather to unleash efforts and attention on the most pressing 
collective problems of our time.   The concept of global sustainable value creation is an archetype that 
draws attention to the urgency of global sustainability problems.  It is precisely because the research 
and action agenda is so complex that we must get started.  
Implementing this agenda will require overcoming barriers that make it difficult for organiza-
tion scholarship to consider an integrative agenda. However, these barriers are not insurmountable. 
For example, teachers of public policy and strategic management often use the IO-perspective to 
explain the neoclassical “welfare loss of monopoly power” approach to public policy (Tirole 1988 and 
Table  1).  We  maintain  that  resources  should  be  leveraged  from  organization  science  scholars  to 
expand these approaches  – not least  because continuing reliance on conventional welfare criteria 
borrowed from economics yields incomplete insights about the efficacy of public policy for both 
public and private welfare, intra- and internationally.   We propose that elective courses be supported 
--- with cross enrollments between students in masters’ and doctoral programs --- in business and   27 
other professional schools. Trans-disciplinary research, supported by innovative funding, publication 
and  policy  models,  is  needed  to  make  headway.  Within  business  schools,  business  historians’ 
emphasis on the complexities of public-private interests should be implemented.  
Implications and Concluding Remarks 
 
Table  1  compares  sustainable  global  value  creation  as  an  alternative  and  complementary 
criterion to the perspectives promoted under neoclassical industrial organization and the traditional 
“systems of innovation” views. The crucial insight offered under the global sustainable value creation 
view is that the benefits and costs of innovation are essentially tied to the interests of both private and 
public parties within nations and internationally; that these interests may change over time in complex 
ways; and that interest alignment is crucial in promoting global, as opposed to localized, interests. 
---------------------------------- 
Place Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Walsh,  Weber  and  Margolis’  (2003)  comprehensive  analysis  of  empirical  research  in  the 
Academy of Management Journal from 1958 to 2000 conclude that the public interest and the social 
objectives  that  were  supposed  to  stand  alongside  economic  objectives  in  orienting  the  work  of 
management scholars have been misplaced and as a field we need to re-balance our focus. The central 
tenet of the current paper is to affirm the need for re-balancing. We have also endeavoured to identify 
steps toward a new framework that may facilitate progress. 
Recent cases of public-private interactions point to issues and considerations that are difficult 
to analyze fully through the traditional tools of neoclassical industrial organization or of systems of 
innovation views. Despite the important progress achieved under each of these views, an opportunity 
arises for deeper investigation of the misaligned and divergent interests of economic agents, and of 
the consequences for sustainable global value creation. The new perspective is needed to advance 
understanding of the endogenous evolution of public policy, pluralism and global governance – three 
important issues in organization science. A focus on sustainable global value creation helps explain, 
predict and prescribe good managerial practice, public policy and global governance.    28 
The  proposed  framework  also  has  important  limitations.  Progress  depends  on  integrating 
different areas of organization science (e.g., agency theory, behavioral theory, dynamic capabilities, 
game theory, institutionalization theory, organizational learning, property rights theory, real options, 
resource-based theory, systems of innovation, and transaction costs theory) conceptually, formally 
(mathematically) and empirically. Current knowledge falls short of building an evolving science of 
organization that contributes systematically to sustainable global value creation. 
The statistician John Tukey (1962: 13-14) wrote that it is “Far better [to offer] an approximate 
answer to the right question, which is often vague, than an exact answer to the wrong question, which 
can  always  be  made  more  precise.”  The  most  important  questions  in  organization  science  are 
theoretically difficult and resistant to empirical analysis.  However, the stakes are simply too high to 
avoid taking risks within the evolving science of organization (Mahoney and McGahan 2007). The 
time has come to do better.   
The  current  paper  describes  several  opportunities  for  further  research  to  accomplish  this 
objective. First, we identify a number of important phenomena that relate to the interplay between 
private and public interests, including the emergence of public-private institutions such as the Gates 
Foundation, the salience and frequency of private actions with public consequence such as in the 
current financial crisis, and the fragility and bluntness of old governance mechanisms such as the 
limited-liability corporation as flagship mechanisms at the interface of private and public interests.  
Organizational researchers with diverse lenses on these phenomena, using established theory, have the 
potential to inform both private business and public policy intended to intervene and shape responses 
at multiple levels. 
Second, we identify several crucial opportunities for the development of theories by organi-
zational  researchers.  These  opportunities  include  extending  current  theory  under  the  institutional, 
resource-based and regulatory (IO) perspectives to inform analysis of the interdependence of private 
and  public  interests  (Aguilera,  Filatotchev,  Gospel  and  Jackson  2008).  We  also  suggest  bridging 
established theories to define new theory, concepts and constructs for understanding organizational 
phenomena. Yet another opportunity for theoretical development concerns the introduction of new 
problems of organization regarding the relationships between private and public interests.  We also   29 
advocate development of new constructs, concepts and theory for interpreting relationships between 
private and public interests, and particularly recommend the application of multi-level analysis for 
generating insight in this area. 
Finally,  we  explain  and  explore  the  concept  of  global  sustainable  value  creation  as  an 
important  construct  for  assessing  public  interests  and  their  relationship  to  private  interests.  This 
concept  is  an  important  complement  to  the  classical  and  neoclassical  concepts  of  allocative  and 
intertemporal  efficiency  because  it  incorporates  externalities,  allows  for  dynamic  efficiencies  and 
inefficiencies,  and  provides  for  the  hard-to-quantify  interests  of  currently  disenfranchised  actors.  
Further research is needed to develop methods for applying this concept empirically and in practice, 
and for refinements for dealing with the range of nuanced problems associated with definitions of 
interests and with their aggregation.     30 
Table 1  
 
 
Three views on sustainable value creation 
 





Traditional Systems of 
Innovation  
 







Value creation through 
the efficient allocation 
of scarce resources; 
emphasis on the 
industry and nation-
wide consumer surplus 
as measure of 
‘welfare’ 
 




creation; emphasis on nation-
wide wealth creation as a 




economic value creation 
through allocative and 
inter-temporal innovation-
induced efficiency and 
knowledge-resource 
creation. World-wide 
sustainable wealth creation 








structures such as 
perfect competition or 
perfect contestability, 










institutions, organizations and 





markets, firms, (intra and 
inter-national) agencies, 









economic bonding and 
monitoring, incentives 





For the vast majority of the 
systems of innovation 
literature, issues of conflict 
and agency are non-existent, 
either at the firm or economy-
wide levels. 
 
Present at firm, national 
and global levels – multiple 
“agencies.” Addressed 
through system interactions 
and a focus on sustainable 
global value creation 
effected through pluralism, 
diversity, mutual 
monitoring and bonding. 
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